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Bat mobiles racing down Grant Street,
2
 fans filling Heinz Stadium bundled in black and 
yellow in the middle of the summer,
3
 and celebrity sightings
4
 in local restaurants can cause 
excitement in the Pittsburgh metropolis.  The Steel City is just one of many areas in 
Pennsylvania that has seen a surge of film production in recent years, causing buzz that a 
permanent film industry and consequently, economic growth is on the horizon.  With the 
approval voting of tax rates on June 30, 2012, Pennsylvania legislators elected to allot $60 
million to the Pennsylvania Film Production Tax Credit Program.
5
  While the new budget allots 
the same amount in tax credits as last year, the program has been passed on a multi-year basis 
until the 2015-2016 fiscal year, introducing the possibility of filming television series for the first 
time.
6  With the renewal of the film tax credit system, some speculate whether the benefits 
postured by its proponents, namely the creation of a new self-sustaining statewide  industry, 
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increases in the total tax revenue for the state, and stimulating economic activity are in fact a 
reality. 
This article will provide an overview of the Pennsylvania film tax credit program and 
question whether the perceived benefits of film tax credits are in fact a reality, and whether the 
legislature should continue to support the program.  
 
THE NATIONAL EXPLOSION OF STATE FILM TAX INCENTIVES 
State film tax incentives have exploded in popularity in the last decade.  As television and 
film industries grew through the 1990s, so did the concern over “runaway productions,” 
television shows and films that are intended for a United States audience but are filmed in other 
countries in order to reduce production costs.
7
  The issue of runaway productions heightened 
after Canada adopted a movie production incentive program in 1997,
8
 sparking an interest in 
U.S. states to introduce their own incentive programs in the hopes of getting a piece of the 
Tinseltown pie.  In 2000, only four states offered subsidies.
9
  Today, forty-five states and Puerto 
Rico offer film incentives including tax credits, rebates, and exemptions.
10
  
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA FILM PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 
The Pennsylvania Film Production Tax Credit (FTC) Program is classified as an 
economic development tool, which is used to cultivate and develop the film industry in 
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Pennsylvania.
11
  The initial program, authorized under Act 55 of 2007, provided a tax credit 
equal to twenty-five percent of a film production’s “qualified Pennsylvania production expenses” 
for film productions where at least sixty percent of the total production budget is spent in 
Pennsylvania.
12
  In its first year, the program cost $75 million, $42 million in the 2009-2010 
fiscal year, and $60 million in the 2010-2011 fiscal year.
13
  
On June 30, 2012, legislators approved another $60 million for film tax credits after 
voting on state tax rates, and increased the credit up to thirty percent for those filming at 
soundstage facilities in Pennsylvania that have at least 7,500 square feet of clear production 
space.
14
  They also approved the credits to be granted over multiple years, allowing the credits to 
be issued to television series for the first time.
15
  Prior to this change, “only one-off television 
productions, such as reality shows and cooking shows, have been eligible for the credits.”16 
In order to participate in the tax credit program, filmmakers complete and submit an 
application package to the Pennsylvania Film Office.  Upon review, they are preapproved for a 
certain amount of tax credits.  Once production begins, filmmakers are required to report to the 
Pennsylvania Film Office at the end of each month and upon the completion of the production, 
filmmakers are mandated to submit a series of reports.
17
  The film tax credits may then be 
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applied against tax liability under several Pennsylvania taxes including personal income tax, 
corporate net income tax, and the capital stock and franchise tax.
18
 
Notably, the FTC is a transferable tax credit, meaning that film production companies can 
either apply their film production tax credits to any Pennsylvania taxes they owe, or they may 
sell or assign the tax credits to one or more third-party Pennsylvanian taxpayers (including 
wealthy individuals and companies).
19
  
The proponents of the FTC program argue that the program creates positive publicity and 
boosts tourism.
20
  Furthermore, it is argued that the renewal of the tax credit program assures the 
growth of a new and sustainable industry, and creates jobs.  The most popular argument for the 
FTC is that the program increases total tax revenue for the state.
21
  Skeptics of the FTC ’s merits 
claim the exact opposite: the program does not stimulate the local economic activity and 
employment nor does it create a profitable and a sustainable new industry in Pennsylvania.
22
   
While it is tempting to say that Pennsylvania can and should try to create economic 
diversity by developing and supporting a film industry until it can sustain itself without a tax 
credit program, a closer examination of the policy reveals three major problems: (1) it is difficult 
to  predict the production’s actions if no tax incentive was available, (2) the race against other 
state’s incentive programs to attract productions creates a never-ending battle, and (3) reports are 
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finding that the program generates  a net loss of tax revenue for the state, and does not create the 
purported numbers of jobs.  
 
THE “BUT-FOR” PROBLEM AND TRANSFERRABLE CREDITS 
For some productions, Pennsylvania is the most attractive filming location, with or 
without the tax credits.  Its urban, suburban, and rural landscapes, coupled with four distinctive 
seasons, make Pennsylvania an ideal location for a variety of films even without the tax credit 
incentive.
23
  Thus, any tax credits for these productions are a waste.  This problem has been 
referred to as the “but-for” problem: it is not possible to know what each production would have 
done but for the incentive.
24
  
The collected data regarding the use of tax credits from the FTC may suggest that a 
majority of productions would have chosen Pennsylvania regardless of the tax credits.  As 
mentioned, with transferrable tax credit, the production company may sell its remaining tax 
credits to other Pennsylvania taxpayers.
25
  In the 2011-2012 fiscal year, sixty-eight production 
companies sold, transferred or redeemed film production tax credit certificates with a total worth 
of $65.7 million.
26
  Ninety-eight percent, or $64.3 million in tax credits were either sold or 
transferred to another entity, with just $1.4 million used by the initial tax credit recipient to 
reduce its Pennsylvania tax liability.
27
  
What is so telling about these figures is that local media and lobbyists in favor of the FTC 
program will name prospective blockbusters and claim Pennsylvania must keep its tax credit 
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program so that these major films will not leave and take advantage of another state’s tax 
incentives.
28
  In reality, major films, such as The Dark Knight Rises and Transformers: Revenge 
of the Fallen, were shot in Pennsylvania without the tax credits.
29
  For other major films that did 
qualify and receive tax credits, such as Unstoppable, Abduction, or Limitless, most sold or 
transferred either all or the vast majority of their  tax credits.
30
 
Moreover, the tax credits are allocated to productions that have long been producing in 
Pennsylvania, even in the absence of any tax incentives.  QVC, the home shopping network, 
Rotfeld Productions, and Center City Video are all headquartered in Pennsylvania and they have 
received tax incentives since 2008, claiming over $5.2 million, $1.1 million, and $1.9 million, 
respectively.
31
  If the main argument by the proponents of the FTC is that it attracts new 
productions, then granting tax credits to productions, such as QVC, Rotfeld Productions, and 
Center City Video,  appears to be wasteful and stands in direct contrast to the claims made by the 
supporters of the FTC program. 
Finally, not only do transferrable tax credits confirm that the productions that would 
attract tourism and publicity to Pennsylvania would come regardless of the tax credits, as shown 
by the overwhelming amount of tax credits that go unused and are transferred to third parties, but 
they bring into light another unsavory fact.  Transferrable credits are profitable for filmmakers 
because they can sell such credits to other companies that owe taxes to Pennsylvania, regardless 
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of their line of business.
32
  The recipients of these transferrable tax credits consist of wealthy 
individuals, financial institutions, and large insurance companies that can use the credits to 
reduce their taxes on premiums.
33
  
The analysis of the unused and transferred tax credits suggests that when producers 
receive tax credits for films that they would produce in Pennsylvania absent the incentive, the 
credits do little but transfer wealth from the taxpayer to production companies or worse, to 
affluent third-parties.  
 
FUTILE COMPETITION BETWEEN STATES AND LEGISLATURE’S ECONOMIC INEPTNESS 
Tax incentives have also become a basis of competition among the states because of a 
“race to the lowest bidder at almost any cost to the state in the name of sparking economic 
development.”34  In some states, film tax incentives have been extremely effective at attracting 
and retaining productions, thus sparking sister states to not only enact a film tax incentive 
program of its own, but to outdo other states.  Advocates of Pennsylvania’s FTC program argue 
that if Pennsylvania does not offer its FTC program, it will have no leverage in attracting 
productions, thus it must continue to expand and increase its tax credits.
35
 
This race to the bottom is misguided and does not account for several factors.  First, with 
forty-four states now offering competitive incentives, the market is oversaturated.
36
  Second, it 
effectively holds Pennsylvania at the mercy of other states’ policies by explicitly engaging in an 
arms race of tax incentives.  In this battle to outdo the other states, multiple states have already 
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increased their subsidies from $4 million in 1999 to $1.4 billion in 2010.
37
  Third, the number of 
films that get released each year is finite and, in fact, is steadily declining.
38
  
Along with the decline of the number of films produced each year, some economists and 
academics are starting to question the “sure bet” of investing in the film industry.39  The 
increasing accessibility of television and film via affordable cable television and the Internet 
gradually displacing cable television represents an ease of access to film and television which 
was never known before during a time of economic adversity.
40
  This increasing reality has been 
taken into serious consideration by several state legislatures, both those with existing tax 
incentives and those that have not yet adopted any kind of film industry incentive.
41
 
In conjunction with the arms race between the states is the oddity of lawmakers acting as 
economists.  In creating the FTC program, the Pennsylvania legislature boasts that it can 
competently anticipate which industries will thrive.  Unfortunately, economists generally agree 
that “lawmakers have little to no success at creating a business cluster where one does not 
already exist.”42  If anything, the fact that film production is becoming more dispersed and more 
mobile, with Hollywood struggling to maintain its status as the center of the film industry, 
should be a major indication that Pennsylvania has a long way to go before it reaches the status 
of becoming a major center for the film industry. 
43
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Moreover, Pennsylvania’s election to continue its FTC program fails to compare the FTC 
program’s benefits with the advantages of applying similar tax incentives to another industry.44  
Policymakers need to be informed of the benefits of giving similar tax credits to another 
industry.  In fact, a report issued by the Economics Research Associates (ERA) in 2009 listed 
“cheese, handtools, milk and butter, leather and hide tanning and fishing, and poultry industries 
as those that have higher multiplier effects than the film industry in Pennsylvania.”45 Thus, every 
dollar spent in any of these industries would produce more spending than a dollar spent in the 
film industry.
46
  
Pennsylvania’s legislators should not lose sight of the future of the film industry as a 
whole when determining if the interests of the Pennsylvania taxpayers will be met by trying to 
establish this new industry, the same idea that forty-five other states have as well.  Moreover, 
Pennsylvania should not be fooled into thinking that other states will not continue to try to outbid 
Pennsylvania’s incentives.47  Pennsylvania must recognize that this type of antagonism is 
economically harmful to the state, and while big productions can bring large sums of money into 
its local economy, policymakers are obligated to explore uses of state funds which may provide 
greater and more consistent returns.
48
 
 
THE REAL COST OF PENNSYLVANIA’S FILM TAX CREDITS 
Arguably, the largest problem with Pennsylvania’s FTC program is the lack of 
transparency and impartial analysis of the actual costs of the program.  In its 2012 report to the 
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Pennsylvania General Assembly on the Film Production Tax Credit Program, the Department of 
Community and Economic Development stated: 
Since the program’s inception, nearly $300 million in state tax credits have been 
approved/awarded to film production companies over the past five fiscal years.  
These companies, in turn, have directly injected well over $1.4 billion into 
Pennsylvania’s economy, generated an estimated $2.7 billion in total economic 
activity, and supported nearly 18,000 jobs.
49
 
 
As a starting point, in order to justify the FTC, its advocates would have to show that the 
price of the tax credits in terms of the lost revenue is lower than the benefit received. However, 
even the most favorable accounting of the FTC admits that the program results in a net loss of 
tax revenue for Pennsylvania.
50
  But how is this possible when the production companies have 
“directly injected well over $1.4 billion into Pennsylvania’s economy”?51  The problem is that 
the film industry and some state film offices have carried out or contracted biased studies, 
finding that film tax credits are highly cost-effective drivers of economic activity.
52
  Conversely, 
the most impartial and cautious studies find just the opposite.
53
  Additionally, a large hurdle in 
assessing the costs of the FTC is the confusion between public and private costs, and the benefits 
of the credits.  Statements in the media concerning the benefits of the FTC program typically 
stress the increases in private sector activity (restaurants, hotels, etc.) and measure them against 
the public sector cost, often without mentioning the consequent lowering of other public 
expenses to offset the lost revenue from the credit.
54
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This comparison creates confusion about the impact of the credit on the budget.  While it 
is true that film incentives induce new productions resulting in private spending, the revenue 
generated from this new economic activity does not raise more money than the cost of the 
incentive to break-even or even generate enough revenue to offset a significant portion of the 
cost. 
55
 
Also, there is the aforementioned issue of transferrable tax credits, resulting in the tax 
credits not being limited to a production’s actual tax liability.  Because productions are permitted 
to sell or transfer tax credits to third-parties, Pennsylvania is losing revenue from those third-
parties, and policymakers cannot maintain that the FTC program only forgives tax liability that 
would not have existed anyway.
56
 
Further, these studies often do not account for the simple but significant fact that some 
productions would likely have located to Pennsylvania without the tax credits.  In fact, the 
majority of film productions have not applied for the FTC, suggesting that the actual response to 
the tax credit is likely well below the purported estimations.
57
  
Finally, the media and the supporters consistently refer to the number of jobs created by 
the FTC.  However, this argument is problematic because the jobs that the supporters are 
referring to are mostly low-skilled, temporary jobs with little upward mobility.
58
  The failure to 
account for the temporary nature of many film jobs leads to greatly exaggerated job creation 
estimates.
59
  Professional and special skilled jobs are often outsourced, with the individual 
traveling with the production from state to state.
60
  Moreover, many of the jobs “created” by the 
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production are merely jobs that have shifted.  For example, “a hairstylist might go from serving 
the public to crimping and curling on film sets.”61 These are just examples of how the lack of  
impartial reports regarding the FTC has created unfounded benefits popularized by the media 
and local film organizations. A closer look at the real costs of this program is necessary in order 
for Pennsylvania to decide if the FTC is really a strong state program.  
 
CONCLUSION 
When Pennsylvania first introduced the Film Production Tax Credit Program in 2007, it 
brought the excitement of a new industry, job prospects, and nationwide attention.  
Unfortunately, with the majority of its sister states vying for the same spotlight coupled with the 
gradually mobilizing nature of the film industry, the moment has come where Pennsylvania’s 
policymakers need to critically look at its FTC program and decide if its serving the best interests 
of its current taxpayers and industries. The legislature must look beyond the local media and 
their starry-eyed constituents and carry out more balanced studies to evaluate the real costs and 
benefits of the FTC. Moreover, the hard question of whether the funding allotted to the FTC 
program may better serve the state in another growing industry needs to be asked.  These steps 
are vital to determine whether the Pennsylvania Film Production Tax Credit Program is a 
blockbuster hit or a hyped-up flop that needs to be cut.    
  
 
 
                                                          
61
 Nathan Benefield, Two Thumbs Down for Film Tax Credits, COMMONWEALTH FOUND. (Jan. 15, 2010), 
http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/policyblog/detail/two-thumbs-down-for-film-tax-credits.  
